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CONTENTS
• The need for a stable monetary policy arises from several facts about business cycles. For example, practically all re-
cessions in industrial countries were preceded by restrictive measures of central, banks. The main cause for the in-
stability, however, was the expansionary policy that led to a boom and too high inflation. There is no question that
high inflation in the long run is caused by high money growth; the empirical evidence in favor of the quantity theory of
money is overwhelming.
• Inflation reduces economic growth considerably if it exceeds a certain level. At rates below 10 percent, the negative
effects appear to be small. But recent studies show that there is a tremendous welfare gain even if inflation is reduced
from a low rate of two percent to zero. This follows from the existence of distorting taxes and from a high demand for
non-interest bearing cash at low rates of interest. The conclusion is that zero inflation can be achieved and that it
produces a sizable free lunch for a society.
• While there is a consensus that monetary policy should follow a rule because discretionary policies have a bias to-
wards higher inflation, it is not clear what the best strategy should be. It is often stated that monetary targeting cannot
be used in the case of an unstable money demand function. This is not necessarily true because this instability can
often be taken account of. Actually, rules exist according to which money growth adjusts to changes in the trend rate
of the velocity of money. An instability of the money demand function does not invalidate the policy of monetary tar-
geting or the main predictions of the quantity theory of money.
• The instability of money demand has led many central banks to pursue inflation targeting instead. But this policy, too,
is fundamentally affected if the demand for money is not stable: The strategy requires a forecast for inflation which
critically hinges on the conditions on the money market. In the case of an instability, it is difficult or even impossible to
predict inflation accurately. This means that inflation targeting may not be better than monetary targeting.
• According to the Taylor rule, which is often propagated, the central bank reacts to the output gap as well as to the
difference between actual inflation and the inflation target. If the central bank wants to set the short-term interest rate
accordingly, an estimate for the real equilibrium interest rate is needed. Given the large variations in the trend of real
short-term interest rates in the past, it is quite possible that a central bank uses a "wrong" estimate when following the
rule. A small underestimation may already produce considerably higher inflation. Such an error is equivalent to the er-
ror concerning the estimate of trend velocity in the strategy of monetary targeting, so both strategies may lead to de-
viations from the target inflation rate. In other words: The Taylor rule is not necessarily superior.
• The future European Central Bank will choose between monetary targeting and inflation targeting. The start of the
European Monetary Union may lead to an instability of the demand for money because of the regime shift. Therefore,
the strategy of monetary targeting may lose some of its appeal. However, it does not follow that it is better to pursue a
policy of inflation targeting. Any strategy will have difficulties when the fundamental link between money, prices, in-
come and interest rates is disturbed.
• The rules for monetary policy have desirable features: inflation is to be kept under control, and fluctuations of output
are to be reduced. But obviously, there is no single rule which is always and everywhere better than the alternatives.
To conclude: It is not justified to disregard monetary targeting — a tendency which seems to prevail among central
bankers and economists alike. After all, the quantity theory of money holds well enough to stress the importance of
monetary aggregates as an anchor for the price level.
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I. Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle
There is a widespread consensus that monetary
policy matters for economic activity, at least to
some degree, as opposed to the postulate of the
real business cycle theory. For example: Prior
to practically all recessions in OECD countries
over the past three decades, short-term interest
rates were raised considerably, money growth
slowed down markedly, or — to take another
indicator of monetary policy — the yield spread
shrank or even became negative. In this sense,
therefore, business cycles are to some extent
avoidable if central banks had a better strategy
at hand or did not resort to a discretionary pol-
icy. The possible benefit of a more stable devel-
opment of output may be large if one considers
the often huge fluctuations of unemployment
over time. However, since most economic the-
ories would consider monetary policy neutral in
the longer run and thus not affecting the natural
level of income and consumption, the "costs of
business cycles" may not be too large alto-
gether. In fact, Lucas (1987) comes up with a
(actually maximum) welfare gain for each US
consumer of just $8.50. He derives the costs of
business cycles from plausible assumptions on
the utility function of consumers and their atti-
tude towards risk. One would have to argue that
more is involved in cyclical fluctuations than
just the consumer's inability to smooth con-
sumption (almost) perfectly if a case is to be
made for a more stable monetary policy.
Another stylized fact of business cycles is the
fluctuation of inflation. Again, practically all
recessions in the OECD countries were pre-
ceded by an acceleration of inflation.
1 This ap-
plies also to all recessions in the United States,
Great Britain and Germany — to mention three
important examples — since World War II. Ob-
viously, too high inflation led central banks to
the above-mentioned reaction of tightening mon-
etary policy. The typical sequence of events
during business cycles is also compatible with
Hayek's notion that "unemployment must fol-
low inflation". Now, what then was the cause of
inflation in the first place?
There is a consensus that monetary policy is
to a large extent responsible for the acceleration
of inflation.
2 One of the best possible ways to
show the strength of the quantity theory of
money is the link between money growth and
inflation over a long time span. Using data for
110 countries for the 1960-1990 period,
McCandless and Weber (1995) present a very
persuasive correlation. The coefficient amounts
to some 0.95, independent of the monetary ag-
gregate chosen (M0, Ml and M2 were used)
and the sample of countries (it applies to the
group of industrial countries as well that were
not among the high inflation economies). Lucas
(1996) reproduced this figure in his Nobel
Lecture praising David Hume for predicting
such a relationship by purely theoretical reason-
ing — Hume had no data on money or the price
level to support his theory.
3
Although the quantity theory seems to be "al-
ways and everywhere controversial" (Laidler
1991), the long-run neutrality of money is cer-
tainly a tenet in all serious models on business
cycles. In addition, the quantity theory cannot
only be used for long-run predictions but is also
applied to short-run price movements in, for ex-
ample, P-star models (Kramer and Scheide
1994). Here, the difference between the equilib-
rium price level, determined by money, and the
actual price level drives the process of inflation.
Another key issue related to a monetary strat-
egy therefore is — besides the impact on the
cycle — the importance of inflation. But how
relevant is this? Does it matter much for eco-
nomic welfare of a country whether inflation
averages 2 percent, 10 percent or 100 percent?
Is inflation not completely neutral with regard
to welfare if it is correctly anticipated and fully
reflected in, for example, nominal interest rates?II. The Benefits of Price Level Stability
1. Inflation Reduces Economic
Growth
While many would agree that inflation does not
raise economic growth, there is some doubt
among the economics profession whether re-
ducing inflation is worthwhile. Many are criti-
cal when it comes to the negative effects on out-
put during the transition when inflation is re-
duced. Huge "Okun gaps" are compared to small
"Herberger triangles" suggesting that disinfla-
tion does not pay but is very costly. This argu-
ment of tremendous so-called sacrifice ratios
needs some clarification.
An economic boom which brings about high
output and low unemployment is by no means a
desirable goal in itself. Economic theory does
not state anything that would justify the target
of a maximum of output or a maximum of em-
ployment. Typically, economic agents are fooled
into working by surprise inflation. Therefore,
any output level above the natural rate means a
welfare loss.
4 Had they not been surprised by
inflation but known their true real wage, people
simply would not work but rather enjoy leisure
which is worth more to them given their prefer-
ences and given market outcomes. So, reducing
output by a "restrictive" monetary policy
5 to
the natural level improves welfare — at least
according to all theories that are based on neo-
classical principles. Often, however, the restric-
tion is stronger and produces another welfare
loss, namely a level of output below the natural
rate. While this may be typical for many epi-
sodes when inflation was reduced to a more de-
sirable level, one has to keep in mind that the
starting point of all these reactions of monetary
policy has practically always been the preced-
ing acceleration of inflation. One may therefore
refer equally well to the costs of inflation when
talking about the corrections that follow. In any
case, the concept of sacrifice ratios is often ex-
aggerated. What should be blamed for a reces-
sion is the policy that has led to the inflation in
the first place.
Because of the close link between money and
prices and the observation that inflation can
practically reach any level, it seems a correct
statement to say that a central bank — or better:
a society — can choose the inflation rate that it
wants to have. Most central banks of industrial
countries have for some time followed a policy
of low inflation. In fact, a recurring statement at
G-7 meetings and similar occasions is that stab-
ility of the price level is a precondition for eco-
nomic growth. What really are the benefits?
One of the most telling empirical investigation
in this regard is Barro's (1995) article about the
relationship between inflation and growth.
6 The
results show quite dramatic negative conse-
quences for very high rates of inflation. This
may be explained by the tremendous distortions
in the economy that are connected with rapid
price increases but also by the fact that high in-
flation may be a symptom of several other
things that go wrong in an economy and thus
are detrimental to growth. For inflation rates be-
low 10 percent, however, the effects seem to be
minor. No strong case can be made that rates of
5 percent are much worse than, say, 3 percent.
Nevertheless, an economy which experiences
inflation of 10 percent will grow by some 0.2
percent less a year than an economy with price
level stability. This adds up to a sizable free
lunch if, for example, the present value of the
additional real income is calculated.
7
2. Zero Inflation — A Sizable Free
Lunch
While such calculations show "real" benefits,
other estimates refer to welfare gains of low in-
flation not always captured in higher GDP
levels. Usually, inflation leads to shoeleather
costs, i.e. people have to go to the bank more
often because of the higher opportunity cost of
holding non-interest bearing cash.
8 Milton
Friedman's approach of balancing the marginal
cost and marginal benefit of money implies that
it is optimal to have a deflation rate equivalentto the rate of productivity growth in an econ-
omy. The welfare gain of a policy which would
produce this outcome critically hinges on the
type of money demand function, in particular
the relationship between money and the interest
rate. Postulating a log-log relationship, Lucas
(1994) argues that there is a high interest elasti-
city of real balances at very low rates of inter-
est. As people do not get saturated with real bal-
ances, the annual welfare gain of Friedman's rule
is substantial, namely one percent of GDP com-
pared to the situation of zero inflation. While
the empirical basis for this may not be over-
whelming — periods of very low interest rates
are rare —, other authors come to a rather simi-
lar magnitude of either deflation or zero infla-
tion (Wolman 1997; Dotsey and Ireland 1996).
For several reasons, however, policymakers
do not find deflation desirable. It may also be
difficult to change the attitude of the popula-
tion.
9 But recent studies come up with a rather
remarkable result: Substantial welfare gains can
be expected even if inflation is reduced from a
low level of two percent (currently prevailing in
most industrial countries) to zero: Feldstein
(1996) as well as Todter and Ziebarth (1997)
argue that such gains follow from the existence
of distorting taxes. Capital gains are taxed in
various ways. Even if the real rate of interest is
the same under the two different levels of infla-
tion, the net real interest rate is not. This is
detrimental to saving and capital accumulation
in the economy. Thus, people who save now in
order to consume later experience a gain of
welfare if— given the tax system — inflation
is brought down to zero as in those examples.
Feldstein's estimate for the United States
amounts to about one percent, Todter and Zie-
barth's estimate for Germany to about 1.4 per-
cent of GDP.
1
0 It must be stressed that this is a
permanent gain, it comes every year, whereas
the costs postulated in the concept of the sacri-
fice ratio are only transitory. Therefore — even
if one accepts the estimates of the sacrifice ratio
in spite of all the inconsistencies — the benefits




To summarize: monetary policy intensifies or
even causes business cycles and produces in-
flation. Thus, the welfare gain to be expected
from a monetary strategy which leads to stable
outcomes would be a sizable free lunch for a
society, and a stable monetary policy can be
seen as an insurance against the negative effects
of economic fluctuations and inflation.
3. Arguments in Favor of Rules for
Monetary Policy
Before I turn to the topic of a good strategy of
monetary policy, one question certainly arises
after the previous discussions: If higher money
growth does not raise output in the long run and
if inflation is costly, why is it that central banks
allow inflation to arise or, to put it bluntly, pro-
duce inflation? The answer probably lies in the
difference in the timing of effects. Since in the
short run output gains seem to be beneficial
(what they are not!), central banks may try to
exploit the Phillips curve by surprise inflation.
One major result of the rational expectations
"revolution" is the description of the policy di-
lemma that a central bank faces: Although it
promises zero or low inflation, it is tempted to
raise money growth in order to reduce unem-
ployment or to prevent it from rising.
12 In this
typical game, the result is the Nash equilibrium
with the suboptimal outcome of higher infla-
tion. A discretionary policy, therefore, does not
lead to satisfactory outcomes (even if central
banks dislike inflation). This is the fundamental
argument in favor of rules for monetary pol-
icy.
1
3 Alan Blinder, however, stresses that
when he was a member of the Federal Reserve
Board, he was never tempted in the way des-
cribed above. But what then are alternative ex-
planations for the existence of suboptimal infla-
tion rates? Looking at the correlation between
money growth and inflation one can certainly
say that only a small part — if at all! — of the
inflation can be "explained" by negative supply
shocks, aggressive wage policy or whatever.
If the target of low or even zero inflation is
accepted, how can it be achieved? What is the
best strategy for a central bank under possibly
uncertain structural relationships? In the follow-
ing sections, the pros and cons of three widelydiscussed alternatives are analyzed: monetary
targeting, inflation targeting and the Taylor
rule. Given the widespread criticism of the pol-
icy of monetary targeting, it is analyzed whether
the arguments against this strategy are valid and
whether the alternatives can be expected to per-
form better under certain circumstances. In Sec-
tion VI, the possible strategy of the future Euro-
pean Central Bank is discussed.
III. Is Monetary Targeting Obsolete?
Given the empirical regularities, monetary tar-
geting is the straightforward application of the
quantity theory. If the target inflation is n' —
the rate that is to be achieved not on a quarter-
to-quarter basis but rather on average for the
medium term — then the growth rate of money
(m) has to follow
[1] Am* = n* -Av + Ay.
Here, the trend values (with a bar) of the
change in output y and in velocity v have to
be estimated. Various methods are used in the
literature.
1
4 The target for money growth can
then simply be derived. This is the procedure
that the Deutsche Bundesbank has followed
since the middle of the 1970s. The rule for
monetary policy looks trivial, but this is what
the quantity theory is.
1
5 The equation can be
used to determine long-run and even short-run
inflation — possibly modified as in, for ex-
ample, the P-star model (Kramer und Scheide
1994) — or to make forecasts. The "charme" is
that money growth and inflation practically
change 1:1 in the long run, the direction of
causation is clear, and any rate of inflation can
be chosen as a target.
1
6 This relationship works
well if the trend growth of output can be esti-
mated well enough — usually this is not seen as
a major problem — and if the trend of velocity
is fairly stable.
1. The Stability of Money Demand —
A Necessary Condition?
The latter "if is a big one. Estimating the trend
may be difficult if money demand becomes un-
stable. This instability is exactly the reason why
so many central banks have given up monetary
targeting.
1
7 It is often claimed that the stability
of the demand for money is a necessary condi-
tion; if it is not stable, monetary targeting does
not make sense, and the central bank has to do
something else.
Would this instability by itself imply that the
fundamental relationships of the quantity theory
do not apply anymore? The evidence presented
by McCandless and Weber (1995) is overwhelm-
ing. Nevertheless, it would be a great surprise if
the money demand functions for each of the
110 countries had been stable over the entire 30
years. There certainly were structural breaks en
masse, but the basic message of the theory
holds anyway. Usually, arguments such as the
Lucas critique or Goodhart's Law are referred
to in order to question the validity of certain
propositions. But: While the Lucas critique
refers to short-run phenomena such as the trans-
lation of a change of money into real and price
effects and while according to Goodhart's Law
the use of a policy instrument may distort its
function as an indicator and thus lead to dif-
ferent outcomes than before, neither Lucas nor
Goodhart question the validity of the long-run
relationship as stated in the quantity theory of
money!
The question whether and how much the in-
stability of money matters can be put in the fol-
lowing way. Consider the typical function
[2] , -p,=co+cly, +c2i,
where real money balances (m-p) depend on
real income y and the nominal interest rate i .
Assume that all variables (including real money)
are integrated of order one. Unit root economet-
rics would imply that the residual e, is station-ary only if the other series are cointegrated. If
they are not, the residual is only stationary in
first differences and the function cannot be
used. But there are many reasons to expect ex-
actly this characteristic (McCallum 1993). The
residual captures, inter alia, changes in transac-
tion technology or other innovations. These oc-
cur normally at irregular intervals, and they are
typically permanent in character. As they are
not reversed, they lead to the non-stationarity of
£,.
Two conclusions follow: First, the money de-
mand function may be amended by using dum-
mies for the periods in which these shocks took
place. Second, and more importantly, the main
implications of the functions will remain intact
if the variance of the residual is small relative to
the change in money. In that case, the typical
policy conclusions will hold, namely that in the
long run, a one percent change in the rate of
monetary expansion leads to a change in the
inflation rate of approximately one percentage
point. In other words, the implications of mone-
tary neutrality continue to hold — or for that
matter: the predictions "monetarists" would nor-
mally make — although money may not be
super-neutral. In fact: the observations for the
110 countries concerning money growth and in-
flation are not on the 45°-line but very close;
this means that there is strong support for the
quantity theory in spite of the fact that money
demand functions are not always and every-
where stable.
2. An Alternative Rule for Money
While the quantity theory holds in the long run,
central banks must have something at hand for
the short run. Their day-to-day actions, even if
they are not discretionary but follow something
like a rule, must take account of uncertainties.
The instability of velocity which obviously oc-
curred at the beginning of the 1980s in the
United States led a few authors to develop a rule
for the money stock, in this case of the mon-
etary base. Meltzer (1987) and McCallum (1987)
proposed a rule of the following type
1
8 in order
to achieve the desired inflation rate n*:
[3] Am* = n* - yi6 (v,_, - v,_17 _, - y,.n)
As the trend of velocity is not known, one
needs an estimate. The average of four years —
admittedly taken ad hoc
1
9 — is used as an ap-
proximation. Applying the same type of esti-
mate for trend output, one can calculate what
excess money is: if Am> Am', then n>n* in
the long run. The performance of this rule was
estimated by McCallum (1987) for the United
States. It could have produced zero inflation on
average and was thus by far superior to the pol-
icy actually pursued.
2
0 Equation [3] can also be
used to explain the recent development of infla-
tion in the United States. Assuming a target for
inflation of 2 percent, one can calculate the rate
of money growth which would deliver this rate.
In Figure 1, actual money growth during recent
years has been lower than the rate compatible
with 2 percent (or even higher) inflation. Thus,
it would have been correct not to forecast an ac-
celeration of inflation — as many did on the
basis of the unemployment rate or some idea of
the NAIRU — but rather a decline which ac-
tually occurred until recently.
2
1
All this means that even in case of an instabi-
lity of money demand, targeting money growth
still makes sense.
2
2 It would be wrong to disre-
gard monetary aggregates altogether either for
evaluating policy or for making forecasts.
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Source: OECD (1998), own calculations.3. Is It Better to Target Interest
Rates?
The type of shocks hitting the economy matters
for the choice of the policy instrument. Poole
(1970) shows in a model with fixed prices that
if money demand shocks are relatively frequent
— as recently in industrial countries —, the in-
terest rate is superior to the money stock. How-
ever, in a more general model this would lead to
an indeterminacy of inflation. If interest rates
are used, there is no anchor for the final target
of the price level.
In general, the problem is that no simple rela-
tionship exists between the money market rate
and inflation that could be exploited for policy
recommendations. It may usually be correct to
say that interest rates should be raised if infla-
tion is too high relative to some target.
2
3 Such
considerations are indeed behind the day-to-day
actions of central banks. But if interest rates are
to be raised: by how much and for how long? In
the strategy of monetary targeting, the policy
advice is straightforward: If inflation is to be
lowered by one percentage point, reduce money
growth by just that amount. Nothing quite as
simple can be said with respect to the interest
rate. In fact, in the long run there is a positive
relationship between the interest rate and infla-
tion, not a negative one which is usually as-
sumed when typical policy recommendations
are made.
This sign switch in the correlation between
the rate of interest and the rate of inflation
makes it impossible to evaluate an interest rate
policy which would deliver the desired inflation
rate. Or, as Lucas (1996: 666) put it: "Central
banks and even some monetary economists talk
knowledgeably of using high interest rates to
control inflation, but I know of no evidence
from even one economy linking these variables
in a useful way ...". Certainly, there is no evi-
dence of the quality as for the money-inflation
correlation as shown by McCandless and
Weber (1995).
IV. Is Inflation Targeting Superior?
Because of the instabilities of money demand,
many central banks have given up using money
as an intermediate target and switched to the
strategy of directly targeting the inflation rate
(e.g. Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Swe-
den). These countries were also successful in
bringing inflation down. However, this "evi-
dence" is not necessarily a reason to believe
that this strategy is superior because inflation
has come down in practically all industrial
countries. One could equally say that the strate-
gy of monetary targeting has continued to be
successful: The Deutsche Bundesbank pursued
this policy — money demand has been suffi-
ciently stable in Germany — and reduced infla-
tion; other countries in Europe, the so-called
DM-bloc, followed this by means of an ex-
change rate target and thus also achieved low in-
flation.
The key point, however, is twofold: First, if
money demand is not stable, is it necessary to
give up monetary targeting? The negative ans-
wer to this question was explained in the pre-
vious section. Second, if money demand is un-
stable, is the strategy of inflation targeting su-
perior? This question can be analyzed by using
a simple macroeconomic model
2
4 (Box). There
is nothing peculiar about this model, it is fairly
standard, so the conclusions are not confined to
a particular ideology. The results are interesting
as far as the price equation is concerned. The
strategy of inflation targeting is based on an in-
flation forecast. This, however, depends among
other things also on the money demand func-
tion: All coefficients show up in the price equa-
tion. If money demand is unstable and/or the co-
efficients are not known, it is impossible — or,
at least, very difficult — to make an inflation
forecast.Box — A Simple Macroeconomic Model for a Closed Economy
[A] y, =bo+bi(i, -E,pl+l + p,) + v, IS curve
[B] m, - p,=co+ c,y, + c2i, + w, Money demand
[C] y, -y, =a(p, -£,.,/?,)+«, Aggregate supply
Equation [A] is an IS curve with output y depending on the real interest rate, which is the difference between the current
nominal rate j' and expected inflation (E is the expectation operator). The LM curve [B] has the usual form with real balances
depending on output and the interest rate j . Equation [C] is a type of the Lucas supply function: output deviates from its
natural level y in the case of a shock or if the current price level p deviates from its expected value.
Solving for two of the endogenous variables y and p gives the following expressions (the third one is r):
[D] y, =-«£,_,/?, +u, - a ( (-c0 + m, + w,) - c2 (-frQ + biE,pl+l - v,) - (-V, - c2)(« Et_xp, - u, - y,)) | _ ^—b^i — c2 + b{c2)
+ y,
bi(-co+m, -wt)-c2(-bQ +blE,pl+l -^-(-y, -c2)(aE,_lP, -u,-y,) -o, + a(-o,c, - c2)+o,c2
As expected, the interdependence of the various equations shows up in a rather complicated way, or in other words: every-
thing depends on everything.
In other words: If the demand for money is
unstable, every strategy of monetary policy has
problems, and it is by no means the case that —
as it is often stated — monetary targeting must
be given up and inflation targeting is the solu-
tion to the problem.
2
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In practice, central bankers try to reduce the
difficulties by "looking at everything", i.e. by
using other variables that may have an impact
on inflation. However, the problem arises that
policy actions can often not be distinguished
from a discretionary policy. According to King
(1996), there is also a good deal of judgment in-
volved when it comes to the inflation forecast
which is derived from, as in the case of Great
Britain, the econometric model of the Bank of
England.
To be sure, the differences between monetary
targeting and inflation targeting are not funda-
mental. In fact, the Deutsche Bundesbank also
has a target for the inflation rate, and propo-
nents of the alternative strategy have over and
over again stated that with a stable money de-
mand function, the two strategies amount to the
same. But it is also true that both strategies face
difficulties in the case of an instability of the
money demand function, and it is not correct to
say that inflation targeting becomes automati-
cally superior.
V. The Taylor Rule: A Good Compromise?
1. The Reasoning Behind the Rule
Also because of the problems of money demand
instability, John Taylor proposed a rule that
uses the short-term interest rate as an instru-
ment (Taylor 1996). The basic idea is that mon-
etary policy can reduce output fluctuations in
the short run, at least to some extent; but in the
long run, it can only affect inflation and should
focus on the target inflation rate (Taylor 1997).
The central bank cannot, however, achieve a
complete stabilization of both output and infla-
tion. There is obviously a trade-off. For ex-
ample, if a negative supply shock hits the econ-
omy, an expansionary monetary policy can re-
duce the output gap but only at the price of
more inflation; if, in contrast, the central bank
wanted to prevent inflation from rising, output10
would be reduced further. In other words: More
output stabilization comes at the cost of more
inflation instability and vice versa, with the op-
portunity costs increasing. Thus, there is a
curve of "production possibilities" with the
usual convex shape (Taylor 1996). The curve
may shift outward, i.e. in the more favorable di-
rection if there is more knowledge about the
short-run dynamics in the economy, more credi-
bility of the central bank and so on.
One version of the Taylor rule is
[4] (n-n')-l3(y-y)
with a>0,/?>0.
The money market rate i is set depending on
the level of actual inflation n and the differ-
ence between actual and target inflation n*.
Furthermore, the interest rate should decrease
with the output gap (y-y). The rule implies
that the interest rate behaves in a similar fashion
as "suggested" by the money demand function.
For example, if output increases, i must in-
crease also if m remains constant; if inflation
goes up, i also has to rise because real bal-
ances are lower. In other words: The interest
rate in the Taylor rule is used as an instrument,
and the central bank "behaves" as if the money
stock is fixed.
The rule appears to be quite attractive since
manipulating the interest rate is close to the ac-
tual policy behavior of central banks. Also, the
rule implies the neutrality of monetary policy: if
inflation rises above the target rate, restrictive
measures are taken. And in the long run, real
variables are not affected, the output gap is zero
on average.
2. What Can Go Wrong with the
Rule?
An important element is the real equilibrium in-
terest rate r . In the steady state, the Fisher con-
dition holds:
[5] i=r+n.
Estimating the real short-term rate that re-
flects the equilibrium is quite a difficult matter.
In the absence of a complex macroeconometric
model one would have to use some average of
past values. But even this poses severe problems.
Figure 2 - Real Money Market Rate in Various Countries
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Source: OECD (1998), own calculations.11
While it is obvious that one has to choose a
time span longer than the duration of a business
cycle, the "correct" length is by no means clear.
The real rate has quite different values for the
three major countries, the United States, Great
Britain and Germany (Figure 2), i.e. the trend
lines
2
6 show remarkable variations over time.
Therefore, it is easily possible that the central
bank in pursuing the Taylor rule uses a "wrong"
estimate of the real rate. What would be the
consequences for inflation?
As an example, let us assume that the estima-
ted rate r is lower than the "true" equilibrium
rate r , i.e. r<r. Assume further that there is
no error concerning the output gap, so that term
is deleted for simplicity.
2
7 The inflation rate can
be derived by combining equations [4] and [5]:
n + r = n + a(n - 7t')+r.
Solving for n results in
[6] n = 71*+(r-r)/a.
This means that permanent inflation would
be higher than the target rate, with the size of
the error depending on the reaction coefficient
a. Commonly, the concrete proposals for the
rule [4] imply a value for a (as well as for /3)
of 0.5 (Taylor 1996). Thus, an error of one per-
centage point concerning the real interest rate
— which is quite possible given the range of
values in Figure 2 — would imply that long-run
inflation would be higher than the target rate by
2 percentage points, i.e. there is a "multiplier
effect". If compared to the strategy of monetary
targeting, it is the same as if the growth rate of
money would be 2 percentage points higher
than justified by the "true" relations; for ex-
ample, if the growth rate of velocity is 2 per-
centage points higher than estimated by the cen-
tral bank, the error concerning long-run infla-
tion would be the same.
At this point it is fair to say that the Taylor
rule implies a correction mechanism. The money
market rate would be raised in the case of this
error because actual inflation would tend to be
higher than the target n*. But this would only
be so after a long time — due to the time lag
between monetary policy and inflation. Anyway,
this example demonstrates that
1. inflation will not be stabilized as desired if a
wrong estimate of the true real interest rate
is used. Output fluctuations would increase
because the initial policy of too much ex-
pansion (a too low interest rate) must be fol-
lowed by a restrictive policy;
2. the target inflation will not be achieved as
desired, or only after a possibly long process
during which the central bank corrects ear-
lier "mistakes".
This, however, should not be interpreted in
such a way as to reject the rule altogether. It
certainly has desirable features, and it is to be
preferred over a discretionary policy also be-
cause it is explicitly focused on achieving a par-
ticular inflation rate. But, as the example shows,
substantial errors are possible here as well. This
means that this rule which was intended to re-
place monetary targeting is not necessarily su-
perior. In both cases, inflation may turn out to
be higher than targeted. But both strategies also
have correction mechanisms. The central bank
following monetary targeting would also adjust
its course if inflation is higher than envisaged,
money growth would be corrected here just as
the interest rate would be corrected with a pol-
icy of the Taylor rule.
3. The Taylor Rule and Actual
Monetary Policy
Empirical evidence suggests that most central
banks behave in a similar manner as the rule
predicts. In a sense, then, it can also be interpre-
ted as a reaction function: Central banks ob-
viously lower interest rates in recessions and
raise them when inflation increases.
2
8 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the ups and downs of
interest rates in reality are close to the rule often
suggested:
[7] {n-n*)-0.5{y-y) .
Again, the policy of three important central
banks is considered. For the United States,12
Great Britain and Germany the inputs are esti-
mated as follows: The output gap is determined
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter for detrending
real GDP. The equilibrium real interest rate is
defined here as the average over the period
1984-1996.
2
9 The inflation target n* has not
been constant over time in all the countries;
therefore, it only makes sense to look at the
more recent years.
3
0 The target levels are 2 per-
cent for the United States and for Germany, and
2.5 percent for Great Britain. Given these as-
sumptions, interest rates were close to their tar-
get value in the United States and in Germany,
in the latter case, the difference has increased
somewhat recently (Figure 3), suggesting an ex-
pansionary policy. The reference for Great
Britain shows that the Bank of England kept the
interest rates "too low for too long", a fact
which would explain the inflationary pressure
in this economy and the central bank's reaction
Figure 3 - Taylor Rule for Various Countries
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of raising rates over the past year. By the way,
it should be mentioned that also the figures on
money growth suggest a very stimulative pol-
icy; this indicator, too, provided reliable infor-
mation on the course of inflation.
VI. Strategies for the European Central Bank
According to the decision of the European
Monetary Institute, two options are available
for the European Central Bank (ECB) as far as
the strategy for monetary policy is concerned:
monetary targeting and inflation targeting.
If the stability of money demand is taken as a
criterion, there seems to be evidence in favor of
monetary targeting. Many empirical studies sup-
port the view that the demand for money is fair-
ly stable for a large currency area in Europe.
3
1
Accordingly, the velocity of money
3
2 shows a
trend which is almost deterministic (Figure 4).
This suggests that the trend growth of velocity,
which is a central variable for the targeted money13
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growth in this strategy, could have been esti-
mated without major problems.
While this would lend support to monetary
targeting as the strategy for the ECB, the start
of EMU itself may lead to an instability of
money demand. The regime shift can pose the
typical problem of the Lucas critique: There will
be only one currency in Europe, and this may
well change the demand for money by firms
and households (Rother 1996). Also, the pos-
sible role as a reserve currency may change the
demand for the euro. It is true, therefore, that
monetary targeting might lose some of its ap-
peal or justification. Nevertheless, for reasons
discussed in Section III, this would not automa-
tically make inflation targeting the superior
strategy. Any strategy will have difficulties
when the fundamental link between money,
prices, income and the interest rate — as im-
plied in the typical demand for money function
— is not stable. Thus, the start of the monetary
union will pose a big problem for the ECB no
matter what.
It therefore seems advisable for the European
Central Bank not to disregard money altogether.
The ECB may gain some reputation by follow-
ing a strategy close to that of the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. It may be difficult to introduce a new
strategy on the European level. Also, one has to
keep in mind that the strategy of inflation tar-
geting was introduced in most countries under
special circumstances: High inflation prevailed,
and the central banks were not independent or
became independent only later. The credibility
also did not come automatically; real long-term
interest rates in those economies were higher
than, for example, in Germany for an extended
period of time.
Apart from these fundamental issues con-
cerning the strategy, there are at least two prac-
tical problems for the starting period of EMU.
The first has to do with the proper definitions of
monetary aggregates. So far, the harmonization
has not fully taken place. Long time series
which would be necessary to evaluate the stra-
tegy of monetary targeting obviously do not
exist. The second problem has to do with the
strategy of inflation targeting. While the Bank
of England, for example, uses a model to pre-
dict inflation and thus has an empirically tested
basis for policy decisions, this condition is not
yet given for the ECB. Major central banks —
among them is also the Deutsche Bundesbank
— did not publish forecasts of inflation, and it
is unclear whether the ECB will have a model
at hand which will generally be accepted as the
basis for monetary policy. So even if inflation
targeting were chosen as the ECB's strategy,
one of the basics just would not exist. In addi-
tion to all possible instabilities of the funda-
mental relationships, these practical issues make
the start of EMU even more difficult.14
VII. Conclusions: Money Still Matters
The practice of monetary policy is certainly not
a trivial task. There seems to be a consensus
that rules are superior to discretionary policies.
All the rules discussed in this paper try to
achieve the same goals: to keep inflation low
(maybe even at zero) and — either by an active
policy or as a side-effect — to reduce fluctua-
tions of output. In this sense, they all have de-
sirable features. But at the same time, it appears
that there is not a single strategy that is always
and everywhere superior to all the others. The
discussion of the pros and cons showed that it is
not justified to disregard money, to give up mon-
etary targeting altogether and switch to one of
the alternatives — a tendency which seems to
prevail among central banks and economists
alike. Apparently, many relationships have be-
come unstable also because of the changes on
financial markets. In the long run, however, the
quantity theory of money seems to hold well
enough to stress the importance of monetary ag-
gregates as an anchor for the price level.15
Endnotes
1 Exceptions are Denmark in 1993/94 and New Zealand in 1994
2 It is true, of course, that often — but certainly not always — real shocks hit the economy and thus produced a surge in
the price level.
3 Hume postulated some non-neutrality of money in the short run as money is not distributed evenly in the "common-
wealth".
4 The definition of the natural rate of output or of unemployment was introduced by Friedman (1968).
^ Output would sooner or later decline to its natural level even without a restrictive policy, i.e. when agents realize their
mistake and react accordingly.
6 In a different study, Pindyck and Solimano (1993) show that inflation is the major factor of uncertainty affecting invest-
ment and thus economic growth.
As an example: If an economy with zero inflation grows at 2.5 percent per year, real GDP in 30 years will be almost
7 percent higher than if inflation was 10 percent. For Germany, this would imply an additional income of DM 3,150 per
person after 30 years. As free lunches go, this is a sizable amount worth having.
8 Lucas (1994: 21 p.) also refers to the costs of having a financial industry. These arise because of a suboptimal rate of
inflation. "In a monetary economy, it is in everyone's private interest to try to get someone else to hold non-interest
bearing cash and reserves. But someone has to hold it all, so all of these efforts must simply cancel out. All of us spend
several hours per year in this effort, and we employ thousands of talented and highly-trained people full-time in the
financial industry to help us. These person-hours — many billions of dollars worth — are simply thrown away, wasted
on a task that should not have to be performed at all."
" For example: If the rate of deflation equals the rate of productivity growth, unions and employers may have to negotiate
about a reduction of nominal wages if unemployment (overall or for particular groups) is to be reduced.
10 Other effects are investigated as well but are of minor importance quantitatively.
1* Referring to welfare gains, Tobin (1977: 467) once stated that "it takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun
gap". Given their new estimates, Todter and Ziebarth (1997: 47) correctly add that "... but it needs only one single
Feldstein trapezoid to do it".
^ One possible reason is related to political business cycles: Before elections, a central bank — if not fully independent —
may want to (or have to) support the government in office by pursuing a stimulative policy.
1
3 The pioneering work is Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
14 Estimating of normal output growth is not trivial; various methods are used in the literature (production functions or
simply trends, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter). The trend of velocity may also be estimated either by purely
statistical methods or by running money demand functions.
" The strategy of the Deutsche Bundesbank also follows directly from Friedman's k-percent rule for money growth. Cf.
Scheide (1989) for a discussion and an empirical test.
'" It is fair to add, however, that the transition from a high rate of inflation to a low target inflation may take time.
17 For Germany, however, several studies show that money demand is sufficiently stable.
1° In addition, McCallum added a term which implies a reaction of the monetary base to deviations of nominal GDP from
its target level. For the purpose of demonstration, this term is deleted here.
1" The time span is long enough to average over purely cyclical influences. One could improve the trend estimate by using
sophisticated detrending methods but this might run counter to the requirement of simple rules.
2" This can be said because the policy would not have altered — certainly not lowered — the path of real output.
2* Whether the turnaround since the middle of 1996 in base money growth" means more inflation in the future is an open
question. It would require excess money growth for some time; it has recently crossed the "critical" line which is
compatible with 2 percent inflation.
2
2 For the purpose of estimating the P-star model, Scheide and Solveen (1998) "solve" the problem of instability of the
demand for M2 in the United States by introducing a dummy variable for the early 1990s.
2
3 It may sound paradox to say that interest rates must be raised at one point in time to have low interest rates in the future.
24 This is a simplified version of the model used by McCallum (1994). There, government expenditures are also included;
furthermore, it is an open economy model, i.e. it contains, among other variables, also the exchange rate.
25 See also von Hagen and Neumann (1996) for a discussion.
2(> The trend is approximated by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter.16
2' The output gap is not a crucial difference to other strategies. For example, with monetary targeting one needs an
estimate of the natural rate of output y , too.
2° For an extensive analysis of reaction functions in general cf. Solveen (1998).
2" The values are 3.0 percent for the United States, 3.8 percent for Germany and 4.8 percent for Great Britain. One may
wonder why the average is so high for Great Britain. Probably the uncertainty concerning the exchange rate policy
played a role. For Germany, the rate is also high compared to the United States; one reason may be the effect of German
unification. This only demonstrates that it is very difficult to estimate the equilibrium real rate. It appears that there are
quite substantial differences of real rates (both long-term and short-term) between countries for reasons not fully under-
stood.
3" For example, the target for the Fed in the United States was probably higher than 2 percent during the 1980s.
3
1 Cf. Browne et al. (1997) for a survey.
3
2 The aggregates used here are the OECD figures for the European Union (EU 15) for Ml and for "broad money".17
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